Abstract. This paper explores if the overall institutional setups to place
Introduction
The debate about the effectiveness and efficiency of the auction mechanisms adopted by sovereign issuers of Government securities is long-standing. Someone may question why are the distinctions theoretical literature makes between different auction formats so important in Treasury security issuances, if award prices may change from one format to another just for few basis points, for auction peculiarities to play an important role. However, just to have an idea of the effect of a saved basis point on a gross public debt of billions of € and to understand why every element of the overall auction procedure is so important, consider the gross issuances in 2005 and the outstanding debt at the end of the same year of the main EMU sovereign issuers (see Table 1 in Appendix I).
Moreover, the growing needs of funds push sovereign issuers to focus more and more on the liquidity of issuances, trying to lower as much as possible their funding costs. Indeed, according to a recent review of the latest developments in the management of Government debt in the euro area (see de Haan and Wolswijk, 2005) , the main objective of debt management agencies is to finance the public debt at low costs with acceptable risks.
1 In addition to cost and risk related objectives, many debt managers have other goals such as duration, relative performance and broadening the investor base, promoting the liquidity and infrastructure of the debt market, and consistency with the aims of monetary policy. Hence, a well functioning Government debt market should result in lower issuance cost and issuance risk. To this respect, the ways to produce cost savings may be different, given that debt management decisions typically deal with the choice of instruments, issuing techniques and institutional arrangements that minimise debt-servicing costs, given a certain risk profile.
The objective of this paper is to raise the broad question of whether the current institutional setup is optimally configured to make sovereign issuers match their objectives in the most efficient way, principally looking at the pricing performance of Treasury auctions with respect to the current secondary market prices. There are several studies which survey Government primary market practices: Bartolini and Cottarelli (1997) document the auction formats adopted in 42 countries, Arnone and Iden (2003) bring evidence on the diffusion of the primary dealership system worldwide, Sareen (2004) makes a review of the overall placement system of a number of OECD countries, Brenner, Galai and Sade (2007) investigate the issuer's choice between the multiple price and the uniform price auctions on a global scale, and Bagella, Coppola, Pacini and Piga (2007) 1 Low risk is generally defined as stable interest expenditure and would imply that a debt manager should issue primarily at the longer end of the yield curve. Such a strategy may, however, conflict with the low cost objective as the yield curve is normally upward sloping and so favours issuance at the short end from a cost perspective. A variety of approaches have been adopted to balance these potentially conflicting objectives, including cost-at-risk (CaR) analysis, the use of derivatives (e.g. interest-rate swaps), extending the investor base, fixed/floating ratios and duration targets.
along with the auction formats review all the institutional details to place Government securities throughout the eurozone.
Obviously the main issue in the debate concerning the best way to place Government securities is the auction format, in particular contrasting the multiple price auction (also pay-your-bid or discriminatory auction) with the uniform price auction. The multiple price auction is the traditional format used for Government securities worldwide, and it was also used in the U.S. for all types of securities until the early 1990s. However, in 1993, the United States started to run uniform price auctions for 2-and 5-year Government notes as an experiment, following an old proposal of Milton 3 Afterwards in 1998, the United States switched entirely to the uniform price auction for all issues. Indeed, to some extent auction theory supports the uniform price format, since it is argued that it is less prone to the winner's curse and to the bidders collusion. 4 Ausubel and Cramton (1998) show that the auction revenues associated with the best scenario which may occur in the uniform price auction are higher than those possible in any scenarios adopting the multiple price auction. Nevertheless, Back and Zender (1993) and Ausubel and Cramton (2002) show that the uniform price auction is often subject to inefficiencies which lead to poor revenue-raising performances. Hence, the revenue ranking of the uniform price auction and the multiple price auction is ambiguous and determining the better pricing rule is necessarily an empirical question. 5 This is reflected in the varied practices worldwide, as Sade, Schnitzlein and Zender (2004) observed:
"Many countries use auctions to sell their Treasury securities. While the institutional details of the auctions differ in a variety of subtle ways across countries, most use a variant of either a uniform or a discriminatory pricing rule. In recent years there are examples of countries switching from the discriminatory to the uniform-price format (e.g., the United the choice between these mechanisms remains an unsettled issue."
However, since very often the devil is in the details, I argue that restricting the attention just at the auction formats may not be sufficient to understand the functioning and the outcome of the placing procedures. Then in the empirical analysis I take into account both some critical features of the overall auction procedure and factors exogenous to the auction mechanism per se, such as the practice of granting the best auction participants the right to syndicate specific issuances, the participation in profitable debt management operations or the option to buy Government securities at the auction price the day after the same auction. Indeed, whereas the former may condition the auction outcome, since even a trivial change in the auction design can have a dramatic impact on prices, 6 as Daripa (2001) and Kremer and Nyborg (2004a) on the other hand, the latter may bias the pricing of auctioned Government securities bearing on the incentives of auction participants with respect to their bidding behavior. In this regard, it is common practice worldwide for Treasuries to avail themselves of a primary dealership system to be sure of the placement of all the securities (see Sareen, 2006) . In such a system, issuers often restrict access to the primary dealers by imposing participation and activity obligations on them on the primary and secondary markets against rents conditional on their compliance with the same 6 To this respect, besides the switch to the uniform-price auction for 2-year and 5-year notes, the Joint Report on the Government Securities Market (January 1992) by the U.S. Dept. of Treasury, SEC, and the Federal Reserve Board, proposed a stronger enforcement of auction rules and to broaden participation in the auctions for all securities. For further institutional details on US auction techniques see http://www.treasurydirect.gov/instit/auctfund/work/work.htm.
obligations, which is assessed according to a special ranking compiled each year by Treasuries. A major weight in the ranking is given to the quantity of securities won in auction. This gives rise to a sort of commodity bundling between the securities being auctioned and the rewards attached to them. Then primary dealers actually bid for a bundle consisting of a Government security and an enhanced probability of winning for example profitable syndication and/or debt management operations rights.
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Therefore, I assess the overall institutional setup to place eurozone Government securities looking at the auction pricing performances and the relating determinants: first I measure the presence of misalignement between primary and secondary market prices along the auction day and then I try to shed light on the causes of the mis-pricing between the two markets, testing some implications coming from auction theory and controlling for the main features of the overall institutional setup. Following the empirical results, I further focus on the latter making a tentative evaluation of one of the main rents granted by the issuer, i.e. the syndication rights, to see whether the auction prices bias can be explained in monetary terms by such conditional rents.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the auction formats adopted in the eurozone, discusses some of the main institutional arrangements to place Government securities and illustrates the operation of the primary dealership system. Section 3 measures the auction pricing performance with respect to current secondary market prices. Section 4 carries on the empirical estimation to identify the determinants of the primary and secondary markets mis-pricing. Section 5 makes a tentavive evaluation of one of the most profitable rents granted to primary dealers and Section 6 further elaborates on the role of the commodity bundling within the economics of Treasury auctions. Section 7 summarizes all the findings and discusses some avenues for further improving the auctioning of Government securities.
Auction formats, institutional features and primary dealership systems
This Section aims at exploring the overall auction environment, with a particular emphasis on the main relevant institutional details to place Government securities: from the auction format to the stop-out price setting procedure, from the syndicated issuances to the practice of ranking primary dealers, from the access to auctions to the obligations imposed upon primary dealers. Special 7 See Grimm, Pacini, Spagnolo and Zanza (2006) for a comprehensive analysis on the economic principles behind the practice of bundling, though in the context of procurement.
attention is given to the operation of the current primary dealership system, through a detailed analysis of primary dealers' requirements, duties and rewards.
Multi unit auction formats for Government securities and the main institutional arrangements
Eurozone sovereign issuers adopt about the same issuance procedures to place Treasury bills and bonds. 8 Government securities are issued either through auction, tap procedure or syndication.
As Table 1 shows, their usage does not vary significantly by country, the prevalent scheme being the use of auction for both T-Bills and T-Bonds and syndication for specific T-Bonds issues. Few
Member States (Finland and The Netherlands) adopt more than one of the above techniques depending on the type of security. Relative to the main institutional structures of Government debt management, issuance is generally either outsourced to a debt management agency or remains within the Ministry of Finance (in some countries performed by the Central Bank). From now onwards I refer either to a debt management agency or a Ministry of Finance as "Treasury".
In all eurozone countries auction mechanisms are used, usually through the multiple price format (in ten countries). In particular six countries run the multiple price auction for both T-Bills and T-Bonds. Three countries (Finland, Italy and The Netherlands) instead use the uniform price method for some of their issuances (T-Bonds in Finland and Italy, T-Bills in The Netherlands) and one, Spain, adopts a hybrid format for both T-Bills and T-Bonds. Finland and The Netherlands issue a relevant part of the debt by tap: the former to issue T-Bills, while the latter for T-Bonds.
However, the operation is not performed in the same way in each country. 9 In most Member States syndication remains a common practice or an open option especially for new benchmark bonds, long term bonds and index linked lines. 8 The securities placed through specific programs (e.g. Global Bond Program, Medium Term Note Program, Commercial Paper Program, etc.) and retail instruments (e.g. they are often specific instruments issued through dedicated placement channels, available to the public at large), which typically account for a small part of the total debt, are not included in the following analysis. 9 Finnish Treasury Bills are currently issued under the T-Bills programme, via what is called the 'daily window'. Whenever there is a need to issue T-Bills, the State Treasury notifies Dealers of the reference price and quantity for sale. The reference price is the price Dealers are allowed to buy at. In The Netherlands, the Dutch State Treasury Agency (DTSA) issues T-Bonds (DSL) through an innovative procedure, called "tap auction", which borrows elements both from a standard tap and a standard auction. This technique consists of the seller announcing the price and the buyers indicating the desired amount. Every second Tuesday of the month, the DSTA announces, at 10 o'clock, the initial ask price at which primary dealers may take up the issue, without communicating the quantity on sale. During the tap-auction, the DSTA adjusts the price upward or downward if capital market developments in general, or demand for the bond in particular, so require. The DSTA places two to three billion euro per month via this procedure. Only Primary dealers are entitled to participate to the tap-auction. The tap-auction usually lasts 5 to 25 minutes, depending on the interplay between DSTA and the Primary dealers. No statistics are released during the tap procedure. According to the DSTA "…Tap auctions have two advantages compared with the issuance technique commonly used in many countries. No time is lost between subscription and allocation, thus eliminating the auction risk. The winner's curse phenomenon, whereby the market falls if a high volume is allocated and vice versa, is also less likely to occur…" (see p. 51 of the Annexes of the DSTA's annual report "Dutch Government Securities 2005"). Therefore, three are the auction formats employed to issue Government securities in these countries: the multiple price auction, the uniform price auction and the "Spanish" auction (the name obviously refers to the fact that Spain is the one using it). In all three formats, bidders submit sealed bids comprising price-quantity pairs in advance of a deadline. After the deadline, the auctioneer unseals the bids and aggregates them, determining the clearing price (stop-out price) at which demand equals supply. Hence, securities are awarded in the order of descending price until supply is exhausted: all bids submitted at prices higher than the stop-out price are allotted for their full amount, whereas bids submitted at the stop-out price may be rationed in the case of excess demand. So, while each bidder wins the quantity demanded at the stop-out price in all the formats, the three auction formats differ in the payment rule. In the multiple price auction, bidders pay what they bid. In the uniform price auction, all winning bidders pay the same price, namely the stop-out price, which is the lowest accepted bid price. In the "Spanish" auction bids made at the minimum price are accepted at the same price; bids falling between the minimum and rounded-up weighted average price also pay the price actually bid; and bids higher than the rounded-up weighted average price pay the rounded-up weighted average price. Hence, the Spanish auction combines elements of the uniform price auction with elements of the multiple price auction. 10 Despite the rich analysis and the numerous results on auction formats obtained by auction theory, there are other important dimensions of the entire auction procedure which may have a critical role in determining the auction outcome. Hence, besides the auction format per se, I review two critical features of the actual auction procedures (see Table 1 ), in particular:
-Access: in most "small" Member States, the access to auctions is typically restricted to primary dealers and in three cases (Belgium, The Netherlands and Portugal) also to some other "recognized" dealers. In the largest countries of the euro-zone (France, Germany, Italy and Spain) the access is unrestricted but for Germany, where auctions are open only to those banks belonging to the so-called Bund Issues Auction Group.
11 It does look therefore that the pressing need of small and medium countries to obtain a liquid issuance program requires them to grant more benefits to primary dealers, in this case in the form of a more protected environment for primary dealership. Indeed, in a repeated auctions framework with a group of informed bidders (in this case the primary dealers), Daripa (2001) shows that allowing free entry to uninformed outsiders (in this case the non-primary dealers) raises the prices paid in auctions by the informed bidders, which makes it unprofitable for the uninformed outsiders entering the auctions.
-Stop-out price setting discretion: during the auction, many Member States explicitly or implicitly enjoy the right to choose the lowest accepted bid price with a great degree of discretion, thus playing an active role in the auction, determining the revenues and the borrowing costs deriving from the auction and possibly influencing bidders' strategies, which would reflect the uncertainty created by the seller's discretion. Back and Zender (2001) prove that such a right operates as a deterrent for some of bidders' speculative behaviors which bring about the inefficiencies to which the uniform price auction is subject (for further insights see also Lengwiler, 1999 , LiCalzi and Pavan, 2005 , and McAdams, 2006 . the discretionary behavior, leaving them great room for manoeuvre. 13 On the other hand, the remaining Member States, which do not provide for any type of intervention in the stop-out price setting procedure, waive an important tool to condition the auction outcome.
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The primary dealership system
To the face of monetary union, the Government security market is fragmented into twelve domestic markets, some of which are quite small in scale. Moreover, the growing needs of funds in the European market make room for an active competition among euro-area issuers, which are focused more and more on the liquidity of issuances, trying to lower as much as possible their funding costs. Such a competition forces convergence in some key-areas of debt management.
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However the most common practice in eurozone is to combine auctions with a primary dealership system. 16 This system was introduced to improve the price discovery process, by requiring primary dealers to actively participate in auctions, to continuously quote two-ways in the secondary market, to foster foreign demand and to reach more non-domestic investors by including foreign firms among them. This is particularly true for small sovereign issuers, otherwise marginal to larger markets. On the other hand, sovereign issuers should create some incentives to gain participation in their domestic markets, that is to provide for some rewards conditional on that. Sareen (2006) shows that the main reason for the adoption of a primary dealership system indeed relies on primary dealers granting the full placement of the amount of securities put in auction (this is the main obligation), although in return for profitable privileges with respect to non-primary dealers, giving raise to a sort of commodity bundling. 17 Indeed, this is the case for the eurozone countries too.
All eurozone countries, except Germany where auctions are open to all those institutions which belong to the so-called Bund Issues Auction Group (see the end of this paragraph), developed a formal system of primary dealership to ensure the placement of their debt in their primary markets 13 See Rocholl (2005) and Keloharju, Nyborg, and Rydqvist (2005) on the main drivers of discretion in this phase, in particular in German and Finnish Treasury auctions, respctively. 14 See Back and Zender (2001) , McAdams (2006) and Lengwiler (1999) for a discussion on the benefits of enjoying some freedom to determine the amount to issue once received all the bids, which basically implies the right to discretionally intervene in the stop-out setting procedure. 15 For example, efficient links have been established between EU Member States settlement systems, market conventions have been harmonised, and the offer has focused on standard "plain vanilla" bonds which are easy to trade. 16 See McConnachie (1996) , Gray (1997) , Arnone and Iden (2003) and Sareen (2004) for previous reviews on the subject. In particular Arnone and Iden (2003) document the popularity of the primary dealership system versus the open participation system worldwide. 17 More specifically, Sareen (2006) argues that the primary dealer model is one channel to resolve the agency problem faced by an issuer in the primary market for Government securities, namely the presence of too few buyers who are willing to subject themselves to participation obligations of the issuer, raising the likelihood of failed primary issuances.
Treasuries' goals regarding allocation, transparency and liquidity of Government securities, it may be desirable to be assisted by primary dealers in the purchase, issuance, trading, promotion and support of Government securities. It is in the best interest of the Treasury that Government securities be allocated adequately to end-investors, that market liquidity and transparency in the secondary market be maximised, and that their status of first class debtors in the capital market be maintained and strengthened. This system normally concerns both T-Bonds and T-Bills markets.
Typically, eurozone Treasuries make use of the services of primary dealers in auctioning, This Paragraph is aimed at reviewing the actual advantages and duties of being a primary dealer operating in EMU Member States Government bonds and bills markets and at assessing their degree of harmonisation. These rules reflect the belief that effectively dealing and placing Government securities requires not only regular participation in auctions but also an active presence in the secondary market and a willingness to play an advisory role with the State issuer. The main characteristics of the primary dealership systems adopted in most Member States, in particular the selection criteria, the rewards and the duties of primary dealers, are the followings:
-Requirements to apply for becoming a primary dealer: generally to obtain the status of "primary dealer", a number of market activities and structural requirements must be met and maintained.
The most widespread requirement refers to the existence of sufficient and qualified human resources, whose presence is deemed by the issuer vital in establishing and maintaining a high level of confidence in the execution of the task. Most Member States require from primary dealers a clear capacity in placing securities and a continuous effective participation in the secondary market. Furthermore, primary dealers are often selected on the basis of their financial strength, as well as their capability for the physical and financial settlement of Government securities and in some cases also on a minimum market share maintained during a specific period in the primary market.
-Primary dealers' obligations: once a financial operator has become a primary dealer, there is a number of duties to be fulfilled both on the primary and secondary market, which mainly relate to participating in auctions, placing Government securities and maintaining a liquid secondary market. More specifically:
• In primary markets, primary dealers must participate to the issuances, often by bidding on each line of any auction, in the majority of cases compatibly with an average annual minimum participation obligation in auctions. Other obligations may relate to the allocation of sufficient resources to support the issuer in its debt management operations and to avoid any distortion in auction prices; • In secondary markets, primary dealers face a number of obligations aimed at maintaining an active participation and enhancing the overall liquidity, by quoting firm prices or rates for at least a minimum amount of securities and within a maximum spread, displaying indicative prices on screens and achieving a minimum market share. Some Member States require them also to ensure the liquidity of the related repo market;
• More generally, in most cases they are also requested:
o to advise and assist the issuer on matters related to issuance policy and debt management, as well as on questions of a more general nature pertaining to the workings of the market, and to keep the issuer informed on market developments; o to promote Government securities by adequate analysis, research and publications; o to report regularly the Treasury on their activity both on primary and secondary markets.
-Primary dealers' privileges: as counterparts to the above obligations, primary dealers enjoy a number of privileges, principally in the primary market. The main privileges offered to them are similar across Member States: they have in most countries an exclusive right to make competitive bids at the auction and non-competitive bids after the auction, to participate to debt buy-backs and exchange operations and to strip and reconstitute Government securities. In many Member States, they also benefit from an exclusive or privileged access to syndicated issues and to the repo market. Moreover, the condition of Primary dealer will be taken into account when the Treasury chooses counterparties for other debt management operations, such as swaps, foreign currency issues or issues by systems other than auctions. Beside the privileges on the primary market and the exclusive right to carry the title of Primary dealer, they often have the right:
• To receive all relevant information about issuance policy and other public market operations and participate in meetings with the issuer;
• To be privileged counterparties of the issuer in its overall debt management activity;
• To be compensated with commissions.
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The activity of primary dealers is constantly monitored in most Member States, according to predetermined criteria. Indeed, most Member States evaluate and rank primary dealers looking at all of the components of their obligations: their participation in auctions (or more generally primary issuances), their presence in the secondary market and the qualitative aspects of the relationship (information, advice, quality of research and promotion of Government securities). Typically, the assessment of their activity is made by assigning different weightings to all such components.
Accordingly, each year the league table of the most active primary dealers in Government securities is published. A good ranking is often needed to have a chance for a place in the syndicated issuances and to access other profitable debt management operations. volume allotted, without quoting percentages, is published annually in a press release. Those member institutions which fail to reach the required minimum share of the total amount allotted will 20 In Finland, commissions to the Primary dealers on primary market shall be agreed upon separately. The commission structure will be defined by the State Treasury and it will be valid until amended or terminated by the State Treasury. This fee structure is confidential. In The Netherlands, Primary dealers are entitled to compensation for their achievements. In Italy, such commissions are paid out by the Bank of Italy, which operates on behalf of the Italian Treasury in the settlement and delivery process, in return for the bidders' commitment to resell the awarded securities to their customers at the stop-out price (weighted average price) in the uniform price auctions (multiple price auctions), without any additional raises. 
The auction pricing performance
In this Section, I examine the performance of most of the auctions held by the euro-zone Treasuries in 2004, checking for the presence of possible mis-pricing for the securities put in auction with respect to secondary market prices. The comparison with the secondary market prices, if liquid and efficient, is certainly the most appropriate way to evaluate the auction performance.
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To this aim, I collected the auction weighted price for multiple price auctions, "Spanish" auctions and tap auctions, and the auction stop-out price for uniform price auctions, for a total of 178 auctions grouped as reported in Table 2 .
The 178 auctions are most of all reopenings of existing lines and cover about 88% of all the Treasury auctions held in 2004 in the eurozone for the Government securities considered (see the related column in Table 2 ). 23 Each auction is identified by the bond's ISIN code and a text abbreviation of the bond's type. These two variables make it possible to link these data with the secondary market from the first release of the MTS Time Series database, which is a new source of high frequency and daily data for a large number of European sovereign bond markets. In particular, I collected the BidPrice1 series, i.e. the best bid quotes available at each moment, from the Tick-by-tick Data BestProposals files for the 178 auction days around the bidding deadline. 24 I choose the bid leg of the bid-ask pairs following the assumption that bidders follow the buy and sell 21 In the Euromoney issue of June 2006 the German Finance Agency states that: "…the syndicate members appointed to distribute the Federal Government's inaugural linker were selected on the basis of the consistency of their participation in the Bund's nominal auctions together with their product and market expertise and the quality of their advice…" (see the Special Publications section on the German Finance Agency official website, www.deutsche-finanzagentur.de). 22 In this case, secondary market prices are considered as the "true" value of the securities. The European Treasury bond wholesale secondary market (EuroMTS) is competitive and efficient, with a large number of participants. Accordingly, it is assumed that MTS prices accurately reflect realized common values of issued Treasury debt. 23 The reopenings held in June and some of the initial auctions, for which secondary market data were not available before the auction deadline, were excluded from the calculation. 24 See Dufour and Skinner (2004) for an exhaustive overview of the MTS Time Series database.
strategy, as argued by Bikchandani and Huang (1993) and documented by Scalia (1997) . 25 Accordingly, three are the differences calculated: the first one is between the auction price and the average of bid quotes during the 30 minutes between the 35th minute and 5th minute before the bidding deadline (mis_ (-35 to -5) ), the second one between the auction price and the average of bid quotes during the five minutes before the bidding deadline (mis_(-5 to 0)), and the last one between the auction price and the average of bid quotes during the 30 minutes between the bidding deadline and the 30th minute after it (mis_(0 to 30)). Table 6 page 24, Scalia (1997) . 26 To make the Italian Treasury auction prices homogeneous with those on the secondary market, I subtract the fee returned by the Italian Treasury to bidders per each security awarded from the stop-out prices, which is equal to 20 cents of euro for the 2-year CTZ and 3-year BTP auctions, to 30 cents of euro for the 5-year BTP and 7-year CCT auctions and 40 cents of euro for all the other auctions. This fee is paid out by the Bank of Italy, which operates on behalf of the Italian Treasury in the settlement and delivery process, in return for the bidders' commitment to resell the awarded securities to their customers at the stop-out price, without any additional rises. Umlauf, 1993 , Nyborg and Sundaresan, 1996 , Malvey and Archibald, 1998 , and Goldreich, 2007 .
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Only two studies employing more recent data, i.e. from 2000 onwards, are closer to my findings:
Rocholl (2005) finds that the average of primary market prices are higher than secondary market prices, even if statistically not significant, showing that the seller in German Treasury auctions sets the auction price equal to the market price on average; Elsinger and Zulehner (2007) show that Austrian Treasury auctions are de facto overpriced. Moreover, the results in Table 3 appear even more puzzling if compared to the theoretical works on multi unit auctions revenue raising abilities, e.g. Back and Zender (1993) or Ausubel and Cramton (1998) , which are all worried about underpricing, and to those studies which try to come up with the issue of underpricing, proposing a series of remedies. 28 However, Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996) show that the liquidity on auction days may vary substantially and that implications about the level of mispricing therefore have to be considered with caution. To this aim, I measured the overpricing throughout the day, namely from 8:30 to 15:00 (in euros per 100 € of face value). Figure 1 shows that on average the overpricing keeps stable on the auction day.
I refer to the following Sections for a discussion on the causes of such results, first looking at the traditional arguments of auction theory and the associated empirical research and then exploring alternative explanations related to the overall placement procedure. Next, I derive the possible implications for the Treasuries and some remedies for a fair pricing of Government securities, in the light of the findings of previous Sections on the primary market institutional arrangements.
27 See Table 1 page 10 in Scalia (1997) or Table X 
A puzzle for the conventional auction theory
The assessment of current issuance techniques to a great extent depends on the way we read the actual evidence of the phenomenon of overpricing in the eurozone primary markets. Indeed, the presence of overpricing is not consistent with the standard homogeneous multi-unit auction theory.
In general it is shown that when bidders have a pure common value and possess private information (assuming they receive strictly-affiliated signals of that value), the issuer should expect revenues less than the expected value of the securities being auctioned, since bidders can extract informational rents from their private information (see Ausubel and Cramton, 1998) . However, it may still be useful to test for the main implications of auction theory to check if the existence of any underlying factor, besides biasing the auction pricing upward, also disrupts such typical relations.
The latter typically relate to the winner's curse, the degree of competition and the auction format, as argued among others by Goldreich (2007) :
"Overall, the results show that underpricing depends on the auction mechanism, the extent of competition in the auction and uncertainty in the auction. These are exactly the economic forces that theory would suggest should affect auction prices."
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To this aim, along with the auction theory suggestions I review the possible underlying factors, though all closely interrelated, among which the measurement method and the presence of market manipulation, the distorting incentives in the evaluation criteria for primary dealers, and the discretion enjoyed by some Treasuries in setting the auction stop-out price.
a) The measurement issue and market manipulation. It has been argued that mispricing as measured by empiricists is not necessarily an accurate reflection of revenue; for example, the benchmark may reflect the (expected) auction outcome (Nyborg and Sundaresan, 1996) . Indeed, the measurement may be highly sensible at the time it is done. Some Treasuries have noticed that secondary market price movements show a V-shape on the auction day, where the V lower corner represents secondary market prices at the auction closing time (see the examples in Figure 1 and 2 in the Appendix II). However, in my sample this was not the case, since on average the overpricing is persistently above zero on the auction day, without showing any definite trend (see Figure 1 at the end of the previous Section). 30 The measurement issue is strictly related to the presence of market manipulation, if any. Indeed, overpricing could be nothing else than evidence of market manipulation. Should this be the case, primary dealers would manipulate secondary market prices around the auction deadline to make primary issuances appear more costly for them in order to defend their current privileges or even to enhance their bargaining power when meeting with Treasuries to renew their contract as primary dealers. 31 To this respect, focusing away from those models which consider a standalone auction and considering those which situate strategic bidding in a richer environment, two 29 See p. 452 in Goldreich (2007) . 30 An appropriate and reliable measurement, i.e. a là Scalia (1998) , should also take into account a profit analysis per bidder considering all the transactions made on the secondary market around the auction day, to see if primary dealers are effectively incurring losses on this dimension of their fixed income business. On the other hand, from a market to market perspective this is indeed the case. 31 For example according to the Agence France Tresor official website "The SVTs (i.e. the French primary dealers) agree to comply with the specifications drawn up annually since 1986. These specifications were the subject of intense discussions with the SVTs, which led to the development of a new charter of the relationship with the Agency France Trésor" (see http://www.aft.gouv.fr/article_788.html?id_article=788).
are the main contributions which could address the overpricing issue: Drudi and Massa (2005) and Bikhchandani and Huang (1989) . 32 Both of them look at how the interaction between the auction market and the secondary market may impact on bidding strategies, in particular inducing bidders to bid more aggressively. Drudi and Massa (2005) provide evidence of price manipulation which show in bidders selling in the morning before the auction deadline to reduce prices, then buying in the afternoon and bidding aggressively at the auction. Bikhchandani and Huang (1989) point to the reverse strategy, namely participants behave aggressively in auction trying to send signals to the secondary market. This relies on the fact that submitted bids reveal the private information of the better informed bidders, influencing the resale price in the secondary market and then creating an incentive for the primary dealers to signal their private information to the secondary market participants. Hence, the phenomenon of overpricing should be treated with caution, and it is important to check for anomalous movements of secondary market prices on the auction day before testing the implications of auction theory (see Figure 1 ).
b) The bundle product. The primary markets here considered strongly rely on a primary dealership system involving a rich set of privileges and duties, which in turn greatly affects the profitability of primary dealers' business. To this respect, Sareen (2006) makes a tentative assessment of the impact of changes in the privileges and obligations system on the dealear's choice about becoming/remaining a primary dealer or not, showing that they significantly impact on it, at least on those dealers who have a limited access to significant client-networks:
whenever the advantages-obligations mix moves against them, they simply quit being primary dealers. Dunne, Moore and Portes (2006) point to European Treasuries deploying the auctionsyndicate structure to guarantee liquidity in their Government bonds as a system which leads to situations where primary dealers actually make losses at the auction stage (i.e. overpricing) spurred on by supernormal syndicate profits. In their game-theoretical model profitable syndicated issuances represent the "carrot" by which Treasuries incentivise dealers to enter the Government security market. Thus, to the extent the rules set by Treasuries bind the main privileges, such as the share of securities a primary dealer can purchase at the auction price in the reserved post-auction reopenings, 33 the right to syndicate longer term or index linked securities, or the access to debt management operations (buy backs, exchanges, swaps…) and repo facilities, to the primary market performances of primary dealers, the phenomenon of 32 There are several studies addressing the interplay between parallel markets trading the same security or relating derivatives. For example, Chatterjea and Jarrow (1998) show how in the auction, the dealer bids aggressively when there are chances of manipulation: if the dealer corners the market, he may charge a premium price in the post-auction secondary market. Still, Nyborg and Strebulaev (2004) study how a potential short squeeze impacts on bidders' strategies and auction performance, and how the design of the auction affects the incidence of short squeezes. 33 See Coluzzi (2007) which values such an option granted by the Italian Treasury to primary dealers, relying on a time homogenous one factor CIR model.
overpricing is nothing else than a visible effect of bundling a number of different commodities.
Indeed, recently, both the Spanish and the Italian Treasury have introduced some changes in the evaluation system of primary dealers. The reasoning behind these changes is the belief that overbidding is closely linked with the aim of scaling up in the ranking of primary dealers in order to improve their chance of being chosen for such profitable debt management operations.
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c) The discretion in the stop-out price setting. The fact that some EU-12 countries effectively "choose" the price, since they decide the supply after observing the bids or keep flexible the relative composition of the durations to be sold only fixing the range of the aggregate supply to be sold (see previous Table 1) , could make such a phenomenon less puzzling. In this case the overpricing would be the result of the Treasury maximizing its revenues choosing cut-off prices on the received aggregate demand above the current secondary market prices. Both Rocholl (2005) and Keloharju, Nyborg and Rydqvist (2005) show that while the Treasuries are committed to maximize their revenues, they do so not in a given auction but under a long term perspective, trying to set the auction stop-out prices as much as possible close to the secondary market prices. Discretion is acted to cope with the potential for underpricing.
Then, the traditional measure of overpricing should be carefully interpreted taking into account the potentially complex interplay between the when-issued market, the auction and the after market, the implications of the primary dealership system and features of the institutional set-up such as the discretion enjoyed by some Treasuries in setting the auction stop-out price. As a consequence, only after having surveyed and assessed the above issues, then one could focus on auction mechanisms in themselves, comparing the best practices worldwide with the state-of-the-art of the auction theory. In the following, I pay more attention to the last two points b) and c), since Figure 1 scales down the role of what in point a). To this aim, I run a series of regressions considering mis_ (-35 to -34 In the Spanish case, those financial institutions that have been announced as top five/six of the group have been selected as book-runners for the major syndicated deals (10-, 15-and 30-year Obligaciones). As from 2006, the bookrunners of the syndicated deals have been instead selected from the top ten of the ranking. The position in the ranking is not communicated to primary dealers. In addition to the aforementioned rule, regularity in the activity of primary dealers is assessed in the qualitative part of the evaluation. Hence, at the end of the year, a comparison of the points obtained monthly by each primary dealer is carried out. Those primary dealers which have been more regular and that stand above the average of the primary dealers receive some points in the qualitative part of the evaluation. This also helps to avoid "excessively aggressive bids" in certain moments of the year. As a complementary measure, the Spanish Treasury analyses the structure of the bids submitted at the auctions and could penalise in the qualitative part of the evaluation those primary dealers which have introduced aggressive prices in the auctions. In the Italian case, since 2005 the Treasury introduced an Auction Aggressivity Index which measures the contribution of the auction strategy of each primary dealer in determining the difference between the auction price and the fair value of the bond (values close to zero in the AAI indicate a strategy that is not very or not at all aggressive). For this parameter a score between 0 and 18 is assigned, a higher score corresponds to low AAI, that is for very low or not aggressive strategies (see the Annex to the Public Director Decree no. 128678 of December 27th, 2006, Ministry of Economy and Finance, Rome).
5)
weighted by duration as the dependent variable (i.e. wgt_mis) and including a composite set of regressors (see Table 4 for the related descriptive statistics and Table 5 for the empirical results), namely:
-l_cover. This is the ratio between the bidders' total demanded quantity and the Treasury allotted quantity in the previous auction for the same security and proxies for the expected auction participation and then expected auction competition. The above mentioned Bikhchandani and Huang (1989) model implies that auction participation measured by the cover ratio should affect the auction cut-off price directly, as shown by Spindt and Stolz (1992) . However, in a commodity bundling perspective, it may be seen as a proxy for the primary dealers competition to gain extra points in the Treasury league table via a higher share of securities won in auction.
Hence, the expected sign of this first explanatory variable on the overpricing is positive.
-vol_mts. This measures the volatility on the secondary market before the auction cut-off time,
that is the standard deviation of secondary market prices during the 105 minutes between the 120th minute and the 15th minute before the bidding deadline. An implication of the generalized winner's curse is that a bidder would reduce his overall demand when uncertainty increases. The implication is that if private information and the winner's curse are important, we should see uncertainty having a positive effect on bid shading, a negative effect on quantity demanded and then a negative effect on overpricing. Hence, when the signals received by bidders are less precise, namely there is a higher dispersion of bidders' expectations on the securities value, the winner's curse should be more severe and then the auction expected outcome for the Treasury will be lower (see Cramton, 2002, and Sundaresan, 2002) . The expected sign of this explanatory variable on the overpricing is then negative.
-depth. It is a liquidity measure on the secondary market calculated as the average amount of securities available at the best bid and ask quotes during the 105 minutes between the 120th minute and the 15th minute before the bidding deadline. It is included in all the specifications of Table 5 to control for the presence of a liquidity effect (see Nyborg and Sundaresan, 1996) , if any. In this case a lower liquidity on the secondary market may increase pressure on the primary market bringing about higher auction prices if bidders enter the auction with significant short positions (see Scalia, 1998, and Strebulaev, 2004) , or may indicate a lower level of information on the security being auctioned which would lower auction prices (see Balduzzi, Elton and Green, 2001, and Fleming and Remolona, 1999) , or may reflect manipulation strategies by some influential bidders (see previous point a) and note 32). Should these be the cases, the expected sign of this explanatory variable on the overpricing is ambiguous, otherwise not significant at all.
-num_pd. This is the number of primary dealers admitted in each national primary market in 2004 and is included to check for any size effect of the primary dealership system on the auction outcomes. By construction, it takes the same value for all the observations related to a specific country.
-num_synd. This is the number of syndicated issuances carried on by each Treasury in 2004 and is intended to assess the effect of one of the most important elements of the commodity bundling on the auction outcomes. As for the previous variable, it takes the same value for all the observations related to a specific country.
-dummies. The remaining labels on Table 5 identify respectively:
• dummies on countries (from austria to spagna), auction formats (uniform and hybrid) or institutional details (discretion, option and access) which take value 1 if the observation falls in the identified category and 0 otherwise. Whereas the dummies on countries and auction formats are immediate to appreciate, those on institutional details work in the following way: if the dummy discretion takes value 1 the observation relates to an auction of an issuer who enjoys the right to intervene in setting stop-out prices; if the dummy option takes value 1 the observation relates to an auction of an issuer who does provide for reserved reopenings to primary dealers (i.e. the latter are granted an implicit call option to purchase a share of the security being auctioned the following day at the auction price); and if the dummy access takes value 1 the observation relates to an auction with free entry, i.e. auction participation is not only restricted to primary dealers; • previous regressors (l_cover, vol_mts, and depth) multiplied by the auction format dummy to test for the presence of structural breaks between different auction formats (see specifications iv.). All the regressions are estimated with ordinary least squares specifying that the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance be used in place of the traditional calculation. Table 5 reports the estimates for six different specifications. Since my conclusions are based on the regression results, this is correct if any error caused by using wrong prices to measure the mispricing is residual in the regressions. However, if the mean error of this measurement error is different from zero, the constant term will incorporate this bias, and the main effect of this measurement error on the regression results is an increase in the variance of the slope coefficient estimates. These errors from using wrong prices may then induce heteroscedasticity. On these grounds, all the regressions are estimated with ordinary least squares specifying that the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance be used in place of the traditional calculation. As Goldreich (2007) , I pool all the auctions together. While all of the specifications include the first three listed regressors, they differentiate for the inclusion or exclusion of the remaining regressors and dummies. The specification i. is the starting one, the specification ii. checks for differences due to a country effect, the specifications iii. and iv. investigate if the country effect comes from the auction formats, whereas specifications v. and vi. if from other institutional details, such as the discretion enjoyed by the issuer in setting the auction stop-out price, the practice of bundling together different commodities, the size of the primary dealership system, or the free access to the auction for financial institutions other than primary dealers. 35 Hence, I first comment on the implications of the overall outcome of each specification to then close on the specific regressors coefficient estimates.
The estimates obtained from specification i. on the first three regressors turn out to be robust throughout the subsequent specifications. Specification ii. suggests the presence of a country effect on the level of overpricing, dividing the sample auctions relating to the nine countries in two groups: the higher level overpricing group includes the auctions of Austria, Greece, Italy and Portugal, whereas the lower level overpricing group comprises the auctions of Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland and Spain. 36 Specification iii. excludes that such a difference on the level of overpricing between countries is due to the actual auction format. Specification iv. further strengthens the previous result, rejecting the presence of any structural break between different auction formats, i.e. the behavior of the first three regressors are not conditioned by the auction formats. The last two specifications finally shed light on the sources of the differences on the level of overpricing among countries found in specification ii., getting closer to its overall significance level (see the related F statistics) and goodness of fit (see the related R-squared).
Given the robustness of the estimates on the first three regressors I continue commenting on them and on the other regressors and dummies. Whereas one of the main implications of auction theory is not verified, namely that the level of auction prices should be lower than the contemporaneous secondary market prices (there is overpricing instead), this is not true for the winner's curse effect. The proxy for uncertainty on the value of the securities being auctioned, i.e.
vol_mts, has the predicted negative effect on the overpricing. The more the uncertainty, the less aggressive the bidding behavior, the less the overpricing. Also the results on depth are to be read in the same way, pointing again to the role of uncertainty in lowering the overpricing. On the other hand, l_cover has a significantly positive impact on overpricing, highlighting the role of competition among bidders. This result is even clearer given the significantly positive effect of the main regressor relating to the commodity bundling, i.e. num_synd (see specification vi.). The more the number of syndicated issuances, the more primary dealers are incentivised to compete to 35 Specifications v. and vi. differ in including discretion and excluding num_synd and viceversa, since they are highly and significantly correlated (-0.83), then biasing the estimates if used together. 36 Finland, Luxembourg and The Netherlands auctions are not included in Table 4 -5 since the first ones did not hold any auctions in the 2004, whereas the last one adopts a tap auction procedure (see note 9).
ameliorate their ranking and improve their chance of winning a place in these operations, the more the overpricing. This clearly indicates that there are forces other than those traditionally suggested by auction theory, i.e. the commodity bundling, which bias upward the auction prices. On the other hand other factors mitigate it. This is the case for the discretion enjoyed by the issuer in setting the auction stop-out price: the dummy discretion shows a significantly negative effect on the overpricing (see specification v.). This is consistent with what found by Rocholl (2005) and Keloharju, Nyborg and Rydqvist (2005) about the principles followed by German and Finnish
Treasuries in setting the auction stop-out price, taking into account that their studies were carried out during periods where the potential for underpricing was the main concern. Interestingly, the auction format is entirely neutral to the overpricing phenomenon (see specifications iii. and iv.).
This is consistent with a little experiment run by the Spanish Treasury in 2002. 37 On the other hand, the result on access is puzzling, since it takes a significantly negative coefficient. Indeed, this
is not consistent either assuming access as an indicator of the presence of randomness in the supply faced by strategic bidders such as the primary dealers (see Back and Zender, 1993) or as an indicator of the possibility for uninformed bidders participation (see Daripa, 2001 ). Finally, the last two remaining dummies (option and num_pd) result as not significant at all. The latter result is reasonable considering that in a context of overpricing the call option is worth less because the strike price is higher than the price of reference in the secondary market, i.e the option is out of the money (though an option still has a value, see Coluzzi, 2007) . 38 I conclude noticing that my results on the role of winner's curse (vol_mts) and competition (cover) are remarkably consistent with those obtained by Goldreich (2007) , 39 whereas they are at odds with respect to the results on auction formats. The latter is due to the fact that Goldreich's sample auctions refer to the same country (the U.S.), which means the same institutional set up. Moreover, the same author does not mention any role for those institutional details here so relevant in biasing the functioning of auction mechanisms. Indeed, both Arnone and Iden (2003) do not document the existence of those privileges typical of the EMU primary markets within the U.S. primary market under the period of Goldreich's analysis, and Sareen (2004) further confirms the absence of any relevant rewards for primary dealers as the U.S. Treasury's debt issuance counterparties. 40 In general, my results on auction formats are in line with the findings of Daripa (2001), who proves the decisive influence of institutional changes on auction revenues, though he focuses the analysis on the introduction of minimum quantity bid, the possibility of free entry and the right to cancel part of the supply (random-supply).
The following Sections focus on the commodity bundling hypothesis to further exploring its relevance in the economics of Treasury auctions and the related main medium-long term consequences for the Treasuries.
A tentavive evaluation of one of the rents enjoyed by the primary dealers in the light of the overall cost of overpricing
As seen in the previous Paragraph 2.2 of Section 2, an important leg of the primary dealership system is made up of a number of privileges enjoyed by the financial institutions belonging to it.
Most of them are very profitable debt management operations, such as buy backs, exchanges, interest rate swaps, syndication and foreign currency issues, or other as much valuable rights such as purchasing a share of the security being auctioned the following day at the auction price (namely a call option on the Government securities being auctioned). 41 Indeed, the condition of primary dealer is a prerequisite when the Treasury chooses counterparties for the above mentioned debt management operations, while a good ranking according to the Treasury's evaluation criteria is often required. Since these criteria largely rest on the primary dealer's compliance with the obligation of purchasing a certain quantity of securities in auction, the apparent costs incurred in
Treasury auctions due to the overpricing phenomenon, should be contrasted with the profits coming from such privileges in order to gain a better insight into the economics of the primary dealership system. To this aim, I calculate the overall cost of overpricing and the profits relating to one of the 40 See the Appendix II p. 63 in Arnone and Iden (2003) and pp. 41-43 in Sareen (2004) . 41 Coluzzi (2007) major privileges: the participation in syndication issuances. I choose the mis_ (-35 to -5) measure of overpricing to obtain the overall cost across all the auctions and the countries considered. In particular, I multiply mis_ (-35 to -5) by the nominal amount issued divided by 100 per each auction and country. 42 Table 6 reports the overall cost of overpricing per each country, except for Finland and Luxembourg which did not hold any auctions in 2004. * It is equal to the sum of the overpricing cost of each auction, which is calculated by dividing the auction amount by 100 and multiplying the result by mis_ (-35 to -5) . ** In percentage of the Nominal amount issued.
Overall cost of overpricing Issuer
On the other hand, I attempt an estimation of the syndication profits in the following way: once retrieved all the details of the syndicated issuances conducted in 2004 across eurozone countries, except for Ireland and Germany which did not provide for this practice yet (see Table 7 ), I establish the average fee (in euros per 100 € of face value) granted to each lead manager of the syndicate on the basis of a survey of the Internationl Finance Review (see the first note of Table 7 ). Accordingly, I calculate the overall profits (i.e. the size of the pie) coming from the syndication rights per each country, knowing the size of the issuances. Then, I contrast these findings with the overall cost of overpricing per each country and for the eurozone on the whole, by calculating the ratio between them (see last column of Table 7 ). It turns out that the syndication profits are equal to 42 Recall mis_ (-35 to -5 ) is measured in euros per 100 € of face value.
69% of the overpricing costs in the eurozone, ranging between 15% (France) and 254% (The Netherlands) among eurozone countries. Table 6 for each country. The percentage in the last row referring to the euro-zone is calculated excluding Finland from the overall syndicated profits and Germany and Ireland from the overall overpricing cost. *** The two bonds are issued through the DDA which is an hybrid format of syndication (see the relating note in Table 1 
The overpricing as a result of Treasuries bundling several commodities
Treasury securities have traditionally faced underpricing: the prices at which Treasury notes, bills and bonds are sold in auction are lower than the when-issued or secondary market prices. 43 However, in recent years, EU-12 Government securities began to be subject to an overpricing phenomenon: auction prices exceed secondary market prices. The empirical analysis and the evaluations in the previous Sections make it clear that the commodity bundling practice has a major role in feeding this phenomenon. Some evidences along this interpretation emerge elsewhere sometimes surfacing expressly through insiders (see for example Coeuré, 2003) 44 , sometimes implicitly within some of the most recent publications on Treasury auctions (see for example Elsinger and Zulehner, 2007, and Rocholl, 2005) , though the latter do not even mention the term overpricing even if they find evidence of it in their data. This is because the theoretical and empirical literature was always focused on the underpricing phenomenon, so that even when the opposite is found, it is always interpreted within the underpricing framework. This is just an example of a practice which has gained ground throughout the eurozone and caused the end of the undepricing era to enter the overpricing era. Indeed, primary dealership system and syndication issues are strongly interrelated, at least since the introduction of the euro, as expressly stated by the same issuers, like the Belgian agency:
43 See Table 1 page 10 in Scalia (1997) or Table X prices for (a) only. If one also considers the value of (b-d), then it becomes rather implausible that bundled commodities are being sold at auction for more than their value. In particular, considering (b) and (c), some problems could arise from overpricing, if asymmetries lounge among the primary dealers participating in Treasury auctions. Indeed, all the primary dealers experience negativeprofits from the business of intermediation between primary and secondary markets, whereas only few selected primary dealers earn positive-profits from the business of syndication and debt management operation rights. It is likely that the largest primary dealers would get such rights, whilst the others would never get such a chance. Nevertheless, all the primary dealers compete with each other in the same auctions for the relevant Government securities. Then, this implies that the smaller primary dealers will end out of the primary market. This is even more severe in uniformprice auctions where all the primary dealers pay the same price for the bundle consisting of a Treasury security and an enhanced probability of winning the syndication or other debt management operations rights. This enhanced probability has positive value for the largest dealers, but zero value for the smaller dealers. In other words, the smaller dealers are being asked to crosssubsidize their larger competitors. The predictable response of the smaller dealers is nonparticipation in the Treasury auction. And non-participation reduces the competitiveness of the Treasury auction, inevitably increasing the Government's borrowing costs. These medium-long term developments are at odds with the Treasury debt management objectives, calling for different solutions, which I will discuss in the conclusions.
Conclusions
Considering the recent debate in a number of European countries about the effectiveness, efficiency and operation of Government security issuance practices, I study the overall functioning of the eurozone issuing systems with respect to the overall objective of financing the public debt at low costs with acceptable risks. However, one of the higher concern of an issuer is the full placement of their debt (see Sareen, 2006) . 49 Then eurozone countries places great emphasis on practices such as granting the right to syndicate specific issuances and participate in profitable debt management operations to the best auction participants or the option to buy Government securities at the auction price the day after the same auction, in order to attract financial institutions to enter their primary dealership system and make them accept participation obligations. This of course 49 An auction failure is not a so remote possibility. Take the example of the Japanese Government bond market: it happened two times, in September 2002 and July 2003, that two benchmark 10-year JGB auctions went undersubscribed.
ensures the full placement of their debt, but entails a sort of commodity bundling between the securities being auctioned and the privileges attached to them, which may bias the auction pricing mechanism. A good ranking is often needed to have a chance for a place in the syndicated issuances and access to other profitable debt management operations. This has gained ground throughout the eurozone, making primary dealership and syndication issuances strongly interrelated, at least since the introduction of the euro (see the excerpts reported in the previous Section). However, I show how this practice has caused the end of the undepricing era to enter the overpricing era. 50 Indeed, the main contribution of this paper rests on bringing evidence for the first time of significant overpricing in Treasury auctions and secondly on ascribing it to the practice of bundling different commodities in Treasury auctions. 51 overpricing. This is consistent with Rocholl (2005) and Keloharju, Nyborg and Rydqvist (2005) which show how the issuer uses its discretion to set auction prices as close as possible to market prices. These conclusions come from the empirical results on the relative dummies variables which clearly indicates that there are forces other than those traditionally suggested by auction theory which bias upward the auction prices (see num_synd), whereas other dummies mitigate it (see discretion). On the other hand, the auction format is entirely neutral to the overpricing phenomenon. Finally, I further validate the hypothesis on the role of the commodity bundling in feeding the overpricing phenomenon by comparing the overall cost of overpricing with the overall profits from one of the major primary dealers privileges (the syndication rights), which result to balance out. To my knowledge there is only one study which mentions overbidding in Treasury auctions, i.e. Dunne, Moore and Portes (2006) , pointing to the auction-syndication model in creating the potential for overbidding, though, therein, the crucial role is played by the opaqueness of the primary market.
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Where will overpricing lead Treasuries? This may have potentially damaging consequences for the issuer, since it creates a rift between primary and secondary markets, pushing end investors to hardly ever participate in auctions and making primary dealership a not deemed profitable activity any more for smaller primary dealers, leading to lower human capital investment and ultimately to concentration among a few intermediaries. Bidding strategy depends on the primary dealer's characteristics, whether it is or not a global market player and whether it is (or is not) able to track and manage cross-subsidies among activities. The strategic behavior of participants should be studied in the broader context of the economics of primary dealership. Even if the profits and costs for the primary dealership system on the whole balance out, the implications for the single primary dealer may be really different. While all the primary dealers experience negative-profits from the business of intermediation between primary and secondary markets, only few selected primary dealers on the basis of the league table drawn up by Treasuries earn positive-profits from the business of syndication and debt management operation rights. It is likely that the largest primary dealers would rank higher and get such rights, whilst the others would never get such a chance.
Nevertheless, all the primary dealers compete with each other in the same auctions for the relevant Government securities. This then implies that the smaller primary dealers will end out of the primary market, lowering the competitiveness of the Treasury auctions and likely increasing the Government's borrowing costs. These medium-long term developments are at odds with the Treasury debt management objectives and require some remedies.
Since the behavior of overbidding seems to be the result of distorting incentives in the evaluation criteria for primary dealers, one possible solution implies that the syndication and debt management operation rights were no longer bundled with the securities at auction. With that, participation by smaller primary dealers would not drop, and competition in the Treasury auction would be maintained. 53 The other possible solution is to explore alternative auction mechanisms such as the clock auctions, and in particular those which put up different items simultaneously, in this case the Government securities and the syndication and debt management operation rights.
Auctioning them simultaneously enables bidders to submit bids based on the substitution 52 Also Bikchandani and Huang (1989) deal with overbidding, however within a model which gives prominence to information asymmetries between the primary and secondary markets. 53 See Grimm, Pacini, Spagnolo and Zanza (2006) which focus on the question whether to bundle contracts or to auction them separately, discussing the optimal division into lots. Even if the paper relates to a procurement context, nevertheless it lays down the economic principles behind the optimal auction design whenever there are different lots/commodities to auction.
